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Closing Pandora’s Box: Proposing a Statutory
Solution to the Supreme Court’s Failure to
Adequately Protect Private Property
I. INTRODUCTION
It is by no means an exaggeration to characterize the Supreme
Court’s 2005 Kelo v. City of New London decision as its most
unpopular ruling in more than a century. Justice Scalia, one of four
Kelo dissenters, went so far as to put Kelo in the company of Dred
Scott and Roe v. Wade—decisions he claimed represented the Court’s
most severe lapses in judgment.1 In Kelo, the Supreme Court upheld
a municipal redevelopment plan that resulted in the forced transfer
of nine residents’ homes to a private development corporation. The
Court held that the increased tax revenue and other secondary
benefits to the city constituted a “public use” under the Fifth
Amendment, justifying the condemnation and forced transfer of the
residents’ homes.2 However, it noted that “nothing in our opinion
precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of
takings power.”3
The subsequent response from state legislatures was
unprecedented. In direct response to Kelo, forty-three states enacted
legislation curbing the use of eminent domain for economic
redevelopment.4 On November 8, 2011, Mississippi became the
forty-fourth, passing a referendum by an overwhelming seventythree to twenty-seven percent majority that placed restrictions on the
transfer of condemned property to private parties.5 On the federal
level, politicians as ideologically diverse as Rep. Maxine Waters (D-

1. Debra Cassens Weiss, Scalia Lumps Kelo Decision with Dred Scott and Roe v. Wade,
ABAJOURNAL.COM (Oct. 19, 2011, 8:05 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/scalia_ lumps_kelo_decision_with_dred_scott_and_roe_v._wade.
2. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005); see infra Part II.C.
3. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489.
4. Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN.
L. REV. 2100, 2101–02 (2009).
5. Ilya Somin, Referendum Initiatives Prevent Eminent Domain Abuse, THE DAILY
CALLER (Nov. 11, 2011, 2:43 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2011/11/09/referenduminitiatives-prevent-emine nt-domain-abuse.
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CA) on the left and Sen. John Cornyn (R-TX) on the right
sponsored bills aimed at enacting similar reforms on a national level.6
While property-rights advocates generally find this barrage of
legislation encouraging, there is some concern that many states’
efforts are merely cosmetic. That is, although the statutes purport to
limit the type of taking at issue in Kelo, they are riddled with
exceptions that eviscerate any substantive protections against forced
transfers to private developers. Other scholars argue that many states
have gone too far, limiting municipalities’ ability to deal with blight
and urban sprawl.7 This Comment surveys enacted state legislation
and proposed federal legislation to evaluate the validity of these
claims. Ultimately, it finds the vast majority of these efforts wanting
and proposes the creation of a federal cause of action modeled
loosely on shareholder derivative suits. Unlike proposed federal
legislation and many state statutes, this approach avoids burdening
federal and local law enforcement, makes economic-development
takings infeasible in most instances, and also allows states the
flexibility they need to deal with actual blight.
This Comment proceeds as follows. Part II demonstrates the
need for a statutory approach to takings reform by showing that Kelo
was simply a logical extension of the preceding 100 years of Supreme
Court precedent. Part III discusses the leading arguments for and
against the use of eminent domain for economic development,
providing context for Part IV’s survey of the many legislative
responses to Kelo. Part V proposes creating a federal cause of action
for property owners involved in improper takings and concludes.
II. WHY A STATUTORY SOLUTION? A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT’S TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
Despite the unprecedented outrage to Kelo among politicians,
commentators, and the general public,8 the majority’s reasoning was
largely consistent with more than 100 years of the Supreme Court’s
public-use jurisprudence. This Part traces the genesis of the ultimate
result in Kelo back to the Court’s first public-use holdings in the
latter nineteenth century. Broadly, two lines of cases emerged, with

6. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Part III.A.
8. See Somin, supra note 4, at 2108–14 (cataloguing the disapproval displayed by
politicians, commentators, and the general public that cut across traditional partisan lines).
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some overlap. The first defined public use as “public power”—a
seizure of private property constituted a public use so long as it
furthered the government’s exercise of a constitutional power. The
second defined public use as any action that tended to produce a
“public benefit” or carried out a “public purpose.” Early on, the
Court afforded state governments substantial deference in
categorizing their legislative goals as “public purposes.” In the
twentieth century, the Court began to explicitly rely on both
definitions, granting state legislatures virtually unlimited
condemnation authority while leaving little room for future courts to
impose limitations.
A. Public Use Defined by the Scope of the Government’s Constitutional
Powers
For at least the past century, the Court has defined public use by
reference to the scope of the government’s constitutional authority,
giving substantial deference to legislative determinations that a
particular action constitutes a public use.9 In United States v.
Gettysburg Electric Railway Co., for example, the Court upheld the
federal government’s efforts to condemn the Gettysburg battlefield
under a statute authorizing the construction of public buildings.10
The condemnation upset Gettysburg Electric’s plans to build a
railroad on its own property, and the asserted purpose of the taking
was historical preservation, not erecting public facilities.11 The Court
held that any exercise of eminent domain constitutes a public use if
the condemnation is “necessary or appropriate” to the exercise of
any constitutionally authorized power.12 Moreover, legislative
judgments about what qualifies as a public use under the
Constitution are entitled to deference unless their rationale is
“palpably without reasonable foundation.”13
Nine years later, the Court extended the reasoning from
Gettysburg Electric to takings of a distinctly private character. In
9. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954); Old Dominion Land Co. v.
United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925); Strickley v. Highland Bay Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S.
527, 530–31 (1906); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 368 (1905); United States v. Gettysburg
Electric Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 679 (1896).
10. Gettysburg Electric, 160 U.S. at 681–82.
11. Id. at 680–81.
12. Id. at 679.
13. Id. at 680.
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Clark v. Nash, the Court upheld a Utah statute that authorized a
private party to condemn a portion of his neighbor’s land to access
irrigation water.14 Despite the private nature of the taking, the Court
deferred to the Utah Legislature’s determination that such a use was
indeed “public” under the Constitution.15 Notwithstanding the
Court’s efforts to limit its holding so as not to “approv[e] of the
broad proposition that private property may be taken in all cases
where the taking may . . . tend to develop [a state’s] natural
resources,”16 just one year later it approved a mining company’s
efforts to condemn private property for construction of aerial
transport-bucket lines.17 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice
Holmes noted that the mine’s efforts to ease delivery of its ore to
railways “should not be made impossible by the refusal of a private
owner to sell the right to cross his land.”18 The state legislature’s
determination that such condemnations constituted a public use was
enough to satisfy the Constitution’s public-use requirement.19
The Court reaffirmed the strength of this proposition in Old
Dominion Land Co. v. United States and in Berman v. Parker. In Old
Dominion, Congress condemned a lessor’s land after the owner
refused the government’s offer to buy the property.20 The owner
challenged the taking, asserting that the government’s purpose of
preserving structures it had built during its lease was not a public
purpose.21 The Court upheld the condemnation, holding that
Congress’s declaration that its purpose was indeed a public one
created a rebuttable presumption that the taking did not violate the
public-use clause.22 The Court noted that such legislative
determinations are entitled to deference unless shown to “involve an
impossibility.”23 Similarly, in Berman v. Parker, the Court upheld a
redevelopment project in Washington, D.C., that resulted in the

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
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Clark, 198 U.S. at 370.
Id. at 369–70.
Id. at 369.
Strickley v. Highland Bay Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531–32 (1906).
Id. at 531.
Id.
Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 63 (1925).
Id.
Id. at 66.
Id.
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condemnation of a department store.24 Even though the
redevelopment scheme ultimately transferred the condemned
property to another private party for redevelopment, the Court held
that the taking was for public use.25 It reasoned that because
Congress had the authority to alleviate blight conditions in the
District of Columbia, it also had the authority to employ private
owners to carry out its legislatively determined public purpose.26 The
Court stated that “the means of executing the project are for
Congress and Congress alone to determine, once the public purpose
has been established.”27
B. Public Use Defined as “Public Benefit” or “Public Purpose” Not
Ownership or Access
Although state courts have occasionally defined “public use” as
requiring some degree of public ownership or access,28 the Supreme
Court has never adopted such an interpretation. Beginning at least as
far back as the late nineteenth century, a second line of Supreme
Court precedent adopted a broad definition of public use that
authorizes any taking that produces a public benefit or achieves a
public purpose.29 In Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, the
Court upheld a private taking exercised under a California law that
created cooperative-irrigation districts.30 The law required any
member of a district to pay fees that funded the groups’ collective
efforts to irrigate their land.31 The District condemned and sold the
property of one member who had refused to pay her fee.32 In
upholding the taking and the law that authorized it, the Court noted
that “[i]t is not essential that the entire community, or even any

24. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35–36 (1954).
25. Id. at 33–34.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 33.
28. See Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An
Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 507–
08 (2006).
29. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Rindge Co. v. Los
Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist.
v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
30. Fallbrook, 164 U.S. at 119–22, 160–61.
31. Id. at 116 n.1.
32. Id. at 122.
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considerable portion thereof, should directly enjoy or participate in
an improvement in order to constitute a public use.”33 The “public
purpose” of facilitating the cultivation of millions of acres of arid
property constituted a public use that satisfied the Constitution.34 In
Clark v. Nash, the Court employed a similar definition of public use,
upholding a Utah statute that allowed a property owner to condemn
his neighbor’s land to access irrigation water.35 In defining public
use, the Court noted that the “results upon the growth and
prosperity of the state . . . have a material bearing upon the question
whether the individual use proposed might in fact be a public one.”36
The “public benefits” and “public purposes” that justify a taking
do not necessarily have to be economic in nature, nor must they be
generally available for public enjoyment.37 In Rindge Co. v. Los
Angeles, the Court upheld the condemnation of land traversing a
private ranch for the construction of two highways, both of which
would dead-end within the ranch property without connecting to
any other road.38 The Court held that the taking was for public use
even though the road merely provided a scenic coastal view before
terminating inside the county line.39 It noted that “[p]ublic uses are
not limited . . . to matters of mere business necessity and ordinary
convenience, but may extend to matters of public health, recreation
and enjoyment.”40
Similarly, in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the Court upheld a
taking for which the direct benefits would accrue almost exclusively
to a private party.41 At issue was a federal regulation that authorized
the EPA to use data submitted by pesticide-registration applicants
when evaluating other applicants42 and also disclose some data
publicly to simplify the application process.43 Monsanto challenged

33. Id. at 161–62.
34. Id. at 161.
35. Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 369 (1905).
36. Id. at 398.
37. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Rindge Co. v. Los
Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
38. Rindge, 262 U.S. at 703, 710.
39. Id. at 707–08.
40. Id. at 707.
41. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1014.
42. Id. at 990.
43. Id.
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the public disclosure of data it believed to be intellectual property,
alleging that the disclosure in effect “took” its private property to
benefit other private competitors.44 Despite the Court’s recognition
that “the most direct beneficiaries of EPA actions . . .will be later
applicants who will support their applications by citation to data
submitted by Monsanto,” it held that the taking was for public use.45
It noted that the taking need only have a “conceivable public
character,”46 and that fostering competition in the pesticide market
by removing barriers to entry was “well within the police power of
Congress.”47
C. Midkiff and Kelo: The Public-Purpose and
Public-Power Doctrines Merge
By themselves, neither of the public-use definitions discussed
above provides strong limitations on the government’s eminentdomain powers. Taken together, the government’s condemnation
authority would be virtually limitless, and after the Court’s rulings in
Midkiff and Kelo, that is more or less the case. Today, a “public use”
under the Fifth Amendment is defined by the scope of a sovereign’s
constitutional power,48 and legislatures receive substantial deference
in determining what public needs justify the use of eminent
domain.49 Stated differently, a legislature can use eminent domain to
pursue any public purpose within the scope of its authority, and it
enjoys wide latitude from the court to determine the public purposes
it constitutionally may pursue—a classic case of trusting the fox to
guard the henhouse.
While the Court had articulated the public-purpose and publicpower definitions of public use in prior cases, the Court did not
explicitly rely on both of them in a single case until the middle of the
twentieth century.50 Two of the Court’s most recent takings

44. Id. at 998–99.
45. Id. at 1014–15.
46. Id. at 1014.
47. Id. at 1015.
48. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241–42 (1984).
49. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005).
50. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33–36 (1954) (holding that Congress
could condemn non-blighted property as part of a plan to redevelop a blighted area because it
had the constitutional authority to eliminate blight, and its legislative determination that the
non-blighted condemnation was necessary to exercise its power in such a manner was entitled
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decisions illustrate how difficult it is to place any principled limits on
the power of eminent domain in light of these two definitions.
In Midkiff, the Court upheld a Hawaiian land redistribution
statute that allowed the state to condemn private property and
immediately sell the land to the previous owner’s lessees.51 The act’s
goal was to ameliorate what the legislature determined to be an
inequitable distribution of land; seventy-two private landowners
owned fee title to forty-seven percent of the land in Hawaii, while
the government owned forty-nine percent.52 Even though the act
essentially resulted in the transfer of property from one private party
to another, the Court held that the redistribution efforts of the
Hawaii legislature constituted a public use.53 Citing Berman, it noted
that the “‘public use’ requirement is thus coterminous with the
scope of a sovereign’s police power[].”54 Because a state’s police
power encompasses the authority to regulate oligopolies, and the
legislature believed the land-reform act would remove artificial
distortions in its real-estate market that were injurious to the public,
the act posed no constitutional difficulties.55
Notice that in the absence of either the public-power or publicpurpose definition of public use, the Court would have had room to
invalidate the statute. If public use were only defined in reference to
Hawaii’s police power, the Court could have held that Hawaii
indeed had the authority to regulate oligopolies through use of
eminent domain, but determined that the scheme was ultimately a
taking for “private use” because the statute simply transferred
property from one private party to another. The Court would not
have had to defer to the Hawaii legislature’s determination that the
coerced transfers legitimately served a public purpose. Similarly, if
public use was simply defined by the legislature’s conception of a
public purpose, the Court could have deferred to the legislature’s
determination that correcting real-estate market inequities is a public
purpose, but invalidated the statute because the Constitution
prohibits states from using their regulatory powers to transfer

to deference).
51. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233–34, 241–42.
52. Id. at 232.
53. Id. at 241–42.
54. Id. at 240.
55. Id. at 242.

1338

1331

Closing Pandora’s Box

property from one private party to another. However, if courts must
defer to legislative judgments to determine what constitutes a
legitimate public purpose, and at the same time recognize eminent
domain as a power instrumental to the government’s exercise of any
other constitutional power, there is no principled way to limit
condemnation authority.
The Court’s ruling in Kelo v. City of New London supports this
proposition. In Kelo, the Court sustained a municipal redevelopment
project that condemned non-blighted residential property to make
way for commercial retail space and new housing developments.56
The city’s plans came on the heels of an announcement from a large
pharmaceutical company that planned to build a research facility in
the area. The city hoped the resulting economic activity would end
years of population decline and high unemployment.57 Despite the
fact that the condemned properties would be leased to private parties
for redevelopment, the Court held that the condemnations were for
public use.58 It noted that “for more than a century, our public-use
jurisprudence has . . . afford[ed] legislatures broad latitude in
determining what public needs justify the use of the takings
power,”59 and deferred to New London’s determination that the
condemned properties were “sufficiently distressed to justify a
program of economic rejuvenation.”60 The substantial deference
afforded legislatures was underscored by the Court’s explicit
rejection of any requirement that the public benefits of such a
project be reasonably certain to accrue.61 Finally, the Court pointed
out that New London had authority to use eminent domain to
promote economic development by virtue of a Connecticut statute
that authorized municipalities to take such action.62
Just as the holding in Midkiff relied on the public-power and
public- purpose definitions of public use to uphold Hawaii’s landreform act, the Kelo majority’s rationale necessarily relied on both
principles to uphold New London’s economic-development plan. If
the Court did not view eminent domain as a mere tool at the
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 475, 484 (2005).
Id. at 473–75.
Id. at 483.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 487–88.
Id. at 483–84.
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government’s disposal in its exercise of any other constitutional
power, the Kelo Court could have deferred to New London’s
definition of economic rejuvenation as a public purpose, but then
ultimately concluded that no constitutional power permits the use of
eminent domain to reach such an end. Likewise, without deferring
to New London’s definition of public purpose, the Court could have
conceded that states and municipalities have the constitutional power
to promote economic development generally, but invalidated the
plan because, in this instance, New London was employing its
condemnation authority for a distinctly private purpose.
For these very reasons, the Kelo dissenters struggled to identify
any principle in the Court’s jurisprudence that compelled a different
result. Justice O’Connor, who ironically authored the Court’s
unanimous opinion in Midkiff, argued that economic-development
takings were only permissible to alleviate affirmative harm to society
that emanates from a property’s pre-condemnation use.63 In
Berman, however, the Court allowed the condemnation of a
department store near a blighted area that, by the Court’s own
admission, was not itself blighted.64 Moreover, Justice O’Connor’s
public-harm test ignores states’ historical police power to abate
nuisances without paying property owners a cent of compensation.65
Justice Thomas’s dissent is perhaps most telling. After surveying the
Court’s takings jurisprudence from Fallbrook to Midkiff, he
concluded that the Court should “revisit [its] Public Use Clause
cases and consider returning to the original meaning of the Public
Use Clause.”66 In essence, Justice Thomas saw no way around the
majority holding aside from overturning one hundred years of the
Court’s takings jurisprudence.
III. PRIVATE–PUBLIC PARTNERSHIPS, OR CRONY CAPITALISM?
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST ECONOMIC-DEVELOPMENT
TAKINGS
Defending the ultimate result in Kelo is a lonely endeavor. From
Richard Epstein and Sen. John Cornyn (R-TX) on the right, to the

63. Id. at 500 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
64. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34–36 (1954).
65. Richard A. Epstein, Public Use in a Post-Kelo World, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 151,
168 (2009).
66. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 514–21 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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NAACP and Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA) on the left, pundits and
politicians across the political spectrum have attacked Kelo’s
reasoning and attempted to legislate away its effects.67 However,
critics eager to eliminate economic-development takings altogether
should take care to consider the consequences of such a measure
before proceeding haphazardly. To that end, this Part briefly surveys
the theoretical and practical considerations that justify the use of
eminent domain for economic development. It also discusses the
leading arguments for limiting the government’s condemnation
authority in this arena. This discussion is not intended to be
exhaustive, but it provides context for the policy critiques and
proposals that follow in Parts IV and V.
A. Rationale Supporting Economic-Development Takings
For a variety of reasons, economists and jurists have long
supported the use of eminent domain for urban renewal and
economic development. Economists typically focus on the difficulty
of assembling contiguous property for large-scale development
projects. Because one stubborn property owner can scuttle a socially
valuable investment, they argue, the visible hand of government is
necessary to correct the market’s failure in such instances. Other
scholars point out the significant costs associated with urban sprawl,
contending that eminent domain is one of the few viable solutions
available to urban planners. Finally, recent scholarship suggests that
trimming the government’s eminent-domain authority may
paradoxically provide less protection for private-property owners.
1. The holdout problem: Eminent domain corrects market inefficiencies
The “holdout problem” is perhaps the principal justification for
allowing municipalities to exercise their condemnation authority for
redevelopment projects. Highways, railroads, shopping centers, and
67. Richard Epstein and the NAACP both submitted amicus briefs supporting the Kelo
petitioners. Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kelo, 545
U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108) (Epstein wrote the brief for the Cato Institute); Brief of Amici
Curiae NAACP et al. in Support of Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108).
Rep. Waters (D-CA) and Sen. Cornyn (R-TX) both introduced bills to limit states’ use of
eminent domain for economic development. H.R. 3315, 109th Cong. (2005) (Rep. Waters’s
bill); S. 1313, 109th Cong. (2005) (Sen. Cornyn’s bill). For a discussion of the broad
opposition to Kelo on both the right and the left, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky,
The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1412, 1418 (2006).
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other large-scale projects require developers to assemble contiguous
parcels of land. In some instances, one property owner’s refusal to
sell can lead to delays, increased costs, or the potential failure of a
project.68 The holdout problem arises when owners in such a
position demand a price much higher than the amount that would
persuade them to sell their property under ordinary circumstances. If
owners’ demands raise the costs of the project prohibitively, the
developer may pull the plug, and society forgoes a transaction that
could have left everyone involved better off. A brief numerical
example demonstrates the nature of the problem and why eminent
domain represents an economically efficient69 solution.
Suppose a developer needs one hundred parcels for a project
with a net present value of $700,000. That figure includes expected
future revenue and expenses, including the expected cost of land
purchases. The planned development will add several hundred jobs
to the local economy and increase the surrounding property values.
The developer purchases the first fifty parcels near their $10,000
market value without much difficulty. However, as other owners
learn of the developer’s plans, the developer notices it must offer
higher prices to convince each additional buyer to sell. Instead of
$10,000, the developer pays $20,000 for the next twenty-five
properties, $250,000 more than it anticipated. The next fifteen
properties cost $25,000, an additional $225,000 in unexpected
costs. The last ten property owners demand $35,000, bringing the
total unexpected cost of the project to $725,000, and rendering
what was once a profitable endeavor a net loss. Accordingly, the
developer declines to purchase the final ten properties and scraps its
plans for the immediate future.
Many of the owners in the example may have demanded prices
above market value because the higher price reflected a subjective
premium—reasons that the owner had not already sold for market

68. See Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and
Takings, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 160, 160 (2007).
69. The two most common formal definitions of efficiency are Pareto efficiency and
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. A transaction is Pareto efficient if the welfare of some improves
without the welfare of anyone else declining. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is less exacting—if a
transaction produces a welfare surplus to some of sufficient magnitude to exceed the losses
suffered by others, the test is satisfied, and the transaction is “efficient.” See Richard A.
Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN
STATE 42, 51–52 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992).
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value, like sentimental attachment, relocation costs, or the land’s
unique suitability to her needs.70 However, it is also quite possible
that a substantial portion of the last fifty sellers were willing to move
at $10,000 or $12,000, but they demanded higher prices because
they knew the developer could not proceed without each parcel in
the neighborhood; they were “holding out” for the developer’s
highest offer. The result is that ten property owners prevent a
Pareto-efficient71 transaction—property owners would have received
a payment high enough to make them better off after selling their
properties, and the surrounding community would have enjoyed
higher property values and increased employment. To correct this
market inefficiency, many economists argue that state and municipal
governments should step in and wield their condemnation authority
to force the holdouts to move.72
2. Eminent domain is the only viable solution to urban sprawl
In addition to correcting market inefficiencies, those who
support broad use of eminent domain point out the practical
difficulties of urban planning, particularly the problem of avoiding
urban sprawl and its associated costs.73 Urban sprawl results as
people migrate to lower-density housing further away from the city’s
core. Traffic congestion, increased infrastructure costs, and pollution
soon follow.74 One scholar notes that the average daily commute in
Atlanta is 36.5 miles, and Washington, D.C. residents waste seventysix hours per year sitting in traffic at a cost of $1260 per person.75
Nationwide, one researcher estimated that lost time and fuel
resulting from urban sprawl costs $72 billion per year.76
In order to avoid urban sprawl, city planners argue that they
need the ability to revitalize stagnant urban areas through eminent

70. See Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An
Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 538
(2006).
71. See supra note 69.
72. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Eminent Domain Versus Government Purchases of Land
Given Imperfect Information About Owner’s Valuations, 53 J.L. & ECON. 1, 18 (2010).
73. See Timothy J. Dowling, Reflections on Urban Sprawl, Smart Growth, and the Fifth
Amendment, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 873 (2000).
74. Id. at 875–76.
75. Id. at 875.
76. Id.
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domain—such
efforts
stimulate
employment,
educational
opportunities, and provide other public services that attract middleclass residents that would have otherwise moved to the suburbs.77
One prominent example of what urban planners want to avoid
through such measures are cities along America’s rust belt, like
Detroit, Michigan. The Motor City has hemorrhaged residents since
the 1950s, falling from a population high of almost 2 million to just
714,000 in 2010.78 Detroit has 60,000 empty houses that attract
crime, and plunging property values depress municipal tax revenue
that funds the city’s schools.79 Contrast that description with
Pittsburgh, a city that has faced similar economic hardship. In the
last decade, it seized 1,000 acres of blighted industrial land,
transforming it into thriving commercial space, which resulted in
$4.8 billion in economic development.80 Urban planners point to
Pittsburgh as an eminent domain success story—a city that
developed a thriving health and technology sector to replace a dying
manufacturing industry and thereby avoided the fate of cities like
Detroit.81
3. Allowing economic-development takings actually protects private
property
While most justifications for allowing economic-development
takings focus on efficiency and rational organization, other scholars
have argued that restricting the scope of condemnation authority
would ironically provide fewer protections for property owners.82
What the government is not allowed to do with eminent domain, it
can accomplish through zoning, taxation, or legislation redefining

77. Edward Imperatore, Discriminatory Condemnations and the Fair Housing Act, 96
GEO. L.J. 1027, 1034–35 (2008).
78. The Parable of Detroit: So Cheap, There’s Hope, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22–28, 2011, at
31.
79. Id.
80. Other Shrinking Cities: Smaller is More Beautiful, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22–28, 2011,
at 32, 34.
81. Id. Of course, it is worth noting that Detroit’s now infamous use of eminent
domain to foster economic development produced fewer jobs than headlines. See Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981); Cohen, supra note
70, at 545 (noting that Detroit’s efforts to condemn property for General Motors displaced
4,000 residents, destroyed 1,400 homes, between 140 and 600 businesses, and resulted in
creating just 2,500 jobs, nearly 4,000 fewer than promised).
82. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 67.
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property rights, none of which provide compensation to aggrieved
property owners.83 Thus, all else being equal, property owners would
prefer suffering deprivation through a taking instead of taxation or
burdensome zoning regulations.84 Property rights advocates should,
these scholars argue, push for an expansive reading of public use that
encompasses as much government activity as possible, not limits to
condemnation authority.
B. The Case Against Economic-Development Takings
For a variety of reasons, scholars from across the ideological
spectrum oppose the use of eminent domain for economic
development. Some libertarians concede the theoretical justification
for such takings, but they argue that practical political realities create
perverse incentives that offset any efficiency gains that may result
from a taking.85 Liberals, on the other hand, object to the
disproportionate impact economic-development takings have on
minorities and the poor.86
1. There is no guarantee that economic-development takings actually
lead to economically efficient outcomes
As noted above, one of the principal justifications for allowing
takings for economic development is to alleviate market inefficiencies
produced by the holdout problem.87 Libertarians point out that

83. Id. at 1426–33. It is worth noting that this argument overlooks the potential that
abusive regulations of the sort that the authors describe would constitute regulatory takings.
See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992) (“[T]he Fifth
Amendment is violated when land-use regulation does not substantially advance legitimate
state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.”) (internal citations
omitted).
84. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 67, at 1426.
85. See, e.g., Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A
Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2006);
Carrie B. Kerekes, Government Takings: Determinants of Eminent Domain, 13 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 201 (2011).
86. See, e.g., Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL.
ECON. 473, 495 (1976) (concluding that owners of less valuable properties are systematically
undercompensated compared to higher value property owners); Wendell E. Pritchett, The
“Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 32–35 (2003) (noting that urban redevelopment projects have historically
affected ethnic minorities disproportionately).
87. See supra Part III.A.1.
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political realities surrounding actual takings produce perverse
incentives that lead governments and developers to approve
inefficient projects. They also argue that developers have other tools
to overcome the holdout problem effectively without resorting to
eminent domain.
Neither the developer nor the government has any way of
knowing whether a recalcitrant property owner is a holdout or
simply unwilling to part with his property at fair market value. If the
owner values the property at a price higher than the condemning
authority is willing to pay, a forced transfer is inefficient88 and socially
undesirable,89 but it also produces a windfall for the organization
effectuating the taking.90 Consequently, even in the absence of a
holdout problem, developers and municipalities will always prefer
forced condemnations to voluntary purchases. Furthermore, there
are reasons to believe that under-compensation of the sort described
here is the norm, not the exception.91 To make matters worse, the
parties that typically benefit the most from a taking are not required
to reimburse the state for the cost of condemnation. In effect,
economic-development takings allow developers to acquire land for
free, leading them to lobby for more condemnations than the benefit
of redevelopment would justify.92

88. Notice that such a transfer is not Pareto efficient, and it may not satisfy the KaldorHicks test either. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. That is, the government is better
off having acquired the property for a development project, but the owner is unambiguously
worse off after receiving compensation lower than he valued his property. The transfer will
satisfy the Kaldor-Hicks test only if the benefits resulting from the project outweigh the harm
to owners resulting from under-compensation.
89. See Kelly, supra note 85, at 6–7.
90. The windfall is equal to the difference between the price the owner would have
demanded absent the taking and the price paid as just compensation.
91. See Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988)
(“Compensation in the constitutional sense is therefore not full compensation, for market
value is not the value that every owner of property attaches to his property but merely the
value that the marginal owner attaches to his property. Many owners are ‘intramarginal,’
meaning that because of relocation costs, sentimental attachments, or the special suitability of
the property for their particular (perhaps idiosyncratic) needs, they value their property at
more than its market value (i.e., it is not ‘for sale’).”); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected
Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 107–08 (2006) (explaining
that possession itself naturally increases an owner’s valuation of her own property beyond what
an outsider would attach to it); Kelly, supra note 85, at 6–7 (noting that market value cannot
measure an owner’s subjective valuation of his property).
92. Kelly, supra note 85, at 7–8.

1346

1331

Closing Pandora’s Box

There is some anecdotal evidence to support this proposition.
The redevelopment project in Kelo has resulted in no actual
development on what are now vacant lots previously owned by the
petitioners.93 Additionally, the party that stood to benefit the most
from the condemnation, pharmaceutical giant Pfizer, closed its New
London research development headquarters in 2009.94 Detroit’s
failure to kick-start its local economy through condemning
thousands of homes on behalf of General Motors is also well
chronicled.95
In addition to failing to produce tangible public benefits, some
scholars argue that eminent domain is not even necessary to
overcome the holdout problem in the first place.96 From an
efficiency standpoint, transfers should only occur if the developer’s
offer price exceeds the owner’s valuation of the property.97 Recall
that “holdouts” are not problematic because they refuse to sell; they
are problematic because they refuse to sell even when a developer
offers a price higher than the holdouts’ valuation of the property.98
Because the holdout problem arises when owners become aware that
their parcels are indispensable to large development projects,
developers can effectively eliminate the holdout problem through
use of secret land purchasing agents. Existing owners never realize
the agents are assembling parcels for a large project, and in many
cases, neither do the agents themselves.99 As a result, no purchaser
has an incentive to artificially inflate her price, the developer fully
compensates each owner, and the project only goes forward if the
expected profits from the investment justify the expense of the
project—a Pareto-efficient outcome. If a developer is unable to offer
each individual owner a satisfactory price through secret land
purchases, that means each refusing landowner’s true valuation of
her property exceeded the developer’s willingness to pay.

93. Epstein, supra note 65, at 165–66.
94. Editorial, Pfizer and Kelo’s Ghost Town, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2009, at A20.
95. See Cohen, supra note 70, at 545.
96. Kelly, supra note 85, at 20–22; Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand:
Economic Development Takings After Kelo, 15 S. CT. ECON. REV. 183, 203–10 (2007).
97. Kelly, supra note 85, at 19.
98. See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text.
99. Kelly, supra note 85, at 21 n.110 (explaining Disney’s double-blind purchasing
agent system, where neither the property owners nor the purchasing agents were aware that
properties were being assembled for a larger project).

1347

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2012

Consequently, forcing them to move at any price would not be a
Pareto-efficient outcome. Of course, depending on the value of the
project, such an outcome may not satisfy the Kaldor-Hicks test.
2. The disparate impact of economic-development takings on minorities
and the poor
Not only is there evidence that economic-development takings
produce rather-than-correct market inefficiencies, but many
commentators also point out that such takings disproportionately
target poor minority communities.100 For instance, one of the
country’s first large urban redevelopment projects in New York City
uprooted 11,000 working-class families, replacing them with 8756
middle-class families.101 Several years later, ten of the eleven
neighborhoods singled out by Los Angeles for condemnation and
redevelopment had majority Hispanic or black populations.102
Similarly, Chicago’s efforts to redevelop its south side almost
completely
overlaid
the
area’s
predominantly
black
103
neighborhoods.
To make matters worse, the populations most likely to be subject
to development condemnations are also those most likely to lack the
resources necessary to launch legal challenges to protect their
rights.104 An owner who wants to keep her property might seek an
injunction to prevent the taking, but even a successful action would
not generate money damages to attract attorneys to take the case on
a contingent-fee basis.105
IV. INADEQUACY OF PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Proposals to curb the use of eminent domain in the wake of Kelo
are too voluminous to treat exhaustively. However, the most
practically relevant proposals are recently enacted state legislation,

100. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 55–56 (1993); Imperatore, supra note
77, at 1033–34;Munch, supra note 86, at 495 (finding that owners of less valuable properties
are systematically undercompensated); Pritchett, supra note 86, at 32–35.
101. Pritchett, supra note 86, at 33.
102. Id. at 33–34.
103. Id. at 34–35.
104. Imperatore, supra note 77, at 1034.
105. Id.
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which purport to limit condemnation authority for economic
development, and H.R. 1433, which is now in its third iteration and
currently stalled in the House of Representatives.106 This Part first
presents the results of an exhaustive survey of all fifty states’
eminent-domain regimes. It then examines the weaknesses in federalreform efforts. Despite the flood of post-Kelo reforms from state
legislatures across the country, more than two-thirds of the resulting
legislation is largely cosmetic. Additionally, despite bipartisan support
for eminent-domain reform on the federal level, Congress has been
unable to pass H.R. 1433 in its last three sessions, and the bill’s
substantive protections are fairly modest.
A. State Constitutional Amendments and Statutory Bans: Too Far or
Not Far Enough?
State reform efforts have generally targeted three types of
eminent domain abuse: (1) expansive public-use definitions that
include enhanced tax revenue or employment opportunities to the
general public, which allows condemned property to be transferred
to private developers; (2) vague definitions of blight that enable
municipalities to condemn virtually any type of property and convey
it to private developers; and (3) urban redevelopment statutes that
allow municipalities to condemn entire neighborhoods in which a
sufficient proportion of parcels meet the state’s blight definition.
Without substantive protection in each of these categories, reforms
in the other two are largely ineffectual. For instance, many states
prohibit any condemnation that results in a transfer from one private
entity to another, yet provide an exception for takings that eliminate
blight.107 If a vague blight definition covers most residential
property,108 any protection against condemnations for private
development is largely hollow. Similarly, even a narrow blight
definition coupled with a ban on economic-development takings fails
to protect all property owners if a municipality can condemn non106. See infra note 131.
107. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. §§ 523.271, 523.274, 99.805 (2012).
108. Many states’ blight definitions are so vague that most property satisfies their criteria.
Courts have concluded that Times Square and downtown Las Vegas were ‘blighted,” justifying
condemnations to make way for the New York Times’s new headquarters in Manhattan and
several new casinos on the strip. City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Pappas, 76
P.3d 1, 12–15 (Nev. 2003); W. 41st St. Realty v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 744 N.Y.S.2d
121, 125–26 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002), cited in Somin, supra note 4, at 2121.
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blighted property located in an area predominated by blighted
conditions.109
Unfortunately, few state reform packages provide comprehensive
protection. Table 1 summarizes the results of an exhaustive survey of
eminent domain reform efforts across the country. Of the forty-four
states that have passed eminent domain reform in response to Kelo,
only thirteen provide substantive protection against each of the
potential abuses mentioned above;110 nineteen states do not provide
meaningful limits on economic-development takings, thirty-six states
have blight exceptions with vague definitions of blight, and thirtyone allow non-blighted property to be condemned and conveyed to
a private developer if it is located in a blighted area.111

Table 1—Summary of post-Kelo eminent-domain legislation
Number of states that have passed reform
Number of states that do not meaningfully
limit economic-development takings
Number of states with a blight exception
and vague blight definitions
Number of states that allow non-blighted
property to be taken in a blighted area
Number of states with substantive
provisions in each category

44
19
36
23
13

1. States that failed to meaningfully limit economic-development
takings
Many states have passed measures that purport to limit authority
to condemn private property for economic development, but the
statutory language employed provides condemning authorities with
plenty of wiggle room to seize property and convey it to private
developers. In Wisconsin and Oregon, property cannot be

109. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34–36 (1954) (holding that a non-blighted
department store could be condemned as part of a city’s plan to redevelop a blighted
neighborhood).
110. See Appendix A for a summary of reform efforts in all fifty states.
111. Id.

1350

1331

Closing Pandora’s Box

condemned if the government “intends” to convey or lease the
property to a private entity at the time of the condemnation.112
Despite the ostensible protections against private-to-private takings
the language provides, it is not difficult to imagine problematic
scenarios. A municipality may seize land for a public project but later
find that it does not have adequate funding. A subsequent
conveyance to a private entity for development would be exactly the
type of taking at issue in Kelo, but the problematic “intent” language
would not prohibit it. Similarly, statutes in Missouri, Nebraska, and
Ohio only prohibit takings that are “primarily” or “solely” for the
purpose of economic development.113 Creative city councils could
easily skirt these statutory protections by asserting that a private-toprivate taking enhances public health, safety, or any other purpose
related to a traditional state-police power. Finally, Indiana, Kansas,
and Louisiana enacted statutes that ban takings whose primary
purpose is to enhance tax revenue or employment, but they provide
exceptions
for
“certified
technology
parks,”
legislative
authorizations, and “industrial plant sites,” respectively.114
2. States that employ over- or under-inclusive definitions of blight
While a substantial number of states have managed to pass
legislation that meaningfully limits economic-development takings,
many of them provide exceptions for blight removal, and many of
them define blight in a way that could apply to almost any property
within its borders. For example, North Carolina bans the use of
eminent domain against parcels that are not blighted,115 but it
defines blight as the presence of any one of several vague factors such
as “dilapidation,” “age,” or “obsolescence” that “impairs the sound
growth of the community, is conducive to ill health ” or “is
detrimental to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare . . . .”116
New Hampshire’s blight definition is probably worse, including such
factors as “dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding, faulty

112. See OR. REV. STAT. § 35.015 (2010); WIS. STAT. § 32.03 (2011).
113. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 523.271, 523.274, 99.805 (2012); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76710.04, 18-2103(11) (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 163.01, 1.08 (West 2007).
114. IND. CODE §§ 32-24-4.5-1, 32-24-4.5-7 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-501a,
26-501b (2006); LA. CONST. art. I, § 4, art. VI, § 21.
115. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-515, -512(6) (2012).
116. Id. § 160A-503(2).
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arrangement or design,” “excessive land coverage,” “deleterious land
use or obsolete layout,” or any other factors that are “detrimental to
the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the community.”117 Such an
expansive blight definition eviscerates otherwise strong state
constitutional protections that prohibit takings that transfer property
directly or indirectly to an entity for private development or private
use.118
Other states have either established narrow statutory definitions
of blight or prohibit the use of condemnation authority for blight
removal altogether. Arizona requires that any blighted condition
constitute “a direct threat to public health or safety,” while Georgia
requires the presence of at least two of six factors, the majority of
which involve affirmative harm to the public.119 Florida and New
Mexico are two of four states that do not allow municipalities to
eliminate blight through eminent domain.120 New Mexico provides
municipalities with “all the powers, other than the power of eminent
domain, necessary or convenient” to carry out redevelopment
projects,121 and Florida does not allow condemning property for the
purpose of eliminating blight.122 While property rights activists have
lauded efforts in both states as a model for the rest of the country,123
these measures will diminish municipalities’ ability to deal with actual
blight and urban sprawl,124 or may paradoxically prompt city councils
to adopt vague nuisance ordinances to deal with problems they

117. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 205:2, 205:3–a (2012).
118. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 12-a.
119. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1136(5)(iii) (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1 (2006)
(defining blight as the presence of any two of the following conditions: (i) uninhabitable,
unsafe, or abandoned structures; (ii) inadequate provisions for ventilation, light, air, or
sanitation; (iii) an imminent harm to life or other property caused by a natural disaster; (iv) a
site identified by the Environmental Protection Agency as a Superfund site; (v) repeated illegal
activity on the individual property of which the owner knew or should have known; or (vi)
maintenance of property violates municipal building codes for at least one year after notice of
the violation).
120. The other two are North Dakota and South Dakota. See N.D. CONST. art. I, sec.
16; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32–15–01 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 11–7–22.1, 11–7–22.2
(2006).
121. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-60A-10 (2007).
122. FLA. STAT. §§ 73.013 to .014 (2006).
123. See
Legislative
Center,
CASTLE
COALITION,
www.castlecoalition.org/legislativecenter (grading both states’ reform efforts as some of the
most effective in the country) (last visited Jan. 2, 2012).
124. See supra Part III.A.2.
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previously remedied with compensated takings.125 Utah’s state
legislature may have experienced such problems first hand, as it
reversed a prohibition on blight condemnations just two years after
its initial enactment.126
3. States that allow blight takings of non-blighted property
Several states that provide otherwise exemplary protections
against private-to-private takings in addition to narrow blight
exceptions also allow municipalities to take non-blighted property
located in blighted areas. Nevada’s state constitution prohibits the
direct or indirect transfer of any interest in property taken in an
eminent domain proceeding to another private party, and its blight
definition requires an immediate threat to public safety.127 However,
the state allows condemning authorities to acquire non-blighted
properties through eminent domain if the property is located in an
area in which at least two-thirds of the surrounding parcels are
blighted.128 Similarly, West Virginia, whose blight definition is
somewhat less inclusive than Nevada’s, allows the government to
take non-blighted property if it can show that there are no available
alternative sites in the blighted area and it has taken every reasonable
effort to avoid resorting to eminent domain.129 Even Utah, which
has a fairly narrow public-use definition, allows private owneroccupied homes to be condemned if eighty percent of the property
owners in the area voice their approval.130 Thus, even in states that
appear to provide some of the strongest private property protections
in the country, a model property owner could still face
condemnation if enough of her neighbors allow their property to
deteriorate, or, at least in Utah, prefer she move elsewhere.

125. See supra Part III.A.3.
126. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-6-501, 17C-2-601 (LexisNexis 2012); Legislative
Center: Utah, CASTLE COALITION, www.castlecoalition.org/about/1373 (last visited Jan. 2,
2012).
127. NEV. CONST. art. I, § 22; NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.010 (2011).
128. NEV. REV. STAT. § 279.471 (2011).
129. W. VA. CODE §16-18-6a (2008); W. VA. CODE §§ 54-1-2, 16-18-3 (2006).
130. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 17C-2-601, 78B-6-501 (LexisNexis 2012).
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B. The Feds Fall Short: The Private Property Rights Protection Act
(H.R. 1433)
At least with respect to potential impact and precise statutory
drafting, federal efforts to eliminate economic-development takings
show more promise than the state legislation described above; that
is, if Congress ever decides to pass them. Despite bipartisan support
from co-sponsors as ideologically diverse as Rep. Maxine Waters (DCA) on the left and Rep. Lamar Smith (R-TX) on the right, H.R.
1433, Congress’s latest effort at eminent domain reform, has stalled
in the House Judiciary Committee.131 Previous efforts as early as
2005 have met similar fates.132
Setting politics aside, H.R. 1433 largely avoids many of the
pitfalls that plague state legislation. The bill prohibits federal and
state authorities from using eminent domain authority for economic
development and authorizes property owners to file suit against state
agencies in the event of such a taking.133 Its definition of economicdevelopment takings avoids the problematic ‘intent’ and ‘purpose’
language that plagues some state statutes, focusing instead on
takings that result in the conveyance or lease of property from “one
private person or entity to another . . . for commercial enterprise . . .
or to increase tax revenue, tax base, employment, or general
economic health.”134 The bill includes exceptions for traditional
public works projects135 and blight, but H.R. 1433’s blight exception
requires “harmful uses of land [that] . . . constitute an immediate
threat to public health and safety.”136 Thus, the bill provides
meaningful limits on economic-development takings, has a narrow
definition of blight, and does not allow the taking of non-blighted
properties near blighted areas—so far so good.
Unfortunately, H.R. 1433 does not have any real teeth, and its
enforcement mechanisms are probably inadequate. States that violate

131. Bill Summary and Status, H.R. 1433, 112th Cong. (2011), THOMAS.LOC.GOV,
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:HR01433:@@@X (last visited Jan. 2, 2012).
132. See supra note 67.
133. Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2012, H.R. 1433, 112th Cong. §§ 2–4
(2012), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c112:H.R.1433:.
134. Id. § 9(1).
135. Id. § 9(1)(A) (allowing exceptions for public ownership, hospitals, roads, airports,
common carriers, flood control, abandoned property, and other non-private uses).
136. Id. § 9(1)(B).
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its provisions lose “federal economic-development funds” for up to
two years.137 While it is not clear which federal grants would be
included in that definition, one scholar has estimated that the total
amount of money at stake nation-wide is just $7.4 billion, or 1.8% of
all federal grants to states and municipalities in 2005.138 Additionally,
because the bill allows states to restore their funding by returning
“all real property[,] the taking of which was found by a court of
competent jurisdiction to have constituted a violation” of H.R.
1433,139 states can easily avoid sanctions for any takings for which
the owner did not file suit under federal law, and the bill’s
enforcement provisions certainly do not encourage lawsuits. That is,
although H.R. 1433 purports to create a private cause of action, its
language seems to authorize injunctive relief, not money damages.140
Consequently, because the victims of eminent domain abuse typically
cannot afford to hire an attorney,141 many potential plaintiffs are
unlikely to obtain counsel that would otherwise be available for a
contingent fee.
Perhaps not wholly unaware of these problems, H.R. 1433’s
drafters included provisions that allow the attorney general to receive
reports from aggrieved property owners and file lawsuits against state
agencies on their behalf.142 While certainly an improvement, federal
law enforcement agencies are already overburdened, especially
considering rising threats posed by international terrorism and cybercrime.143 If large-scale financial fraud is currently at the bottom of
federal investigative priorities lists,144 it is not hard to predict where a
$200,000 residential property taking would end up.
V. CONCLUSION: PROPOSING A PRACTICAL, POLITICALLY VIABLE
NATIONAL SOLUTION
This Comment has pointed out a number of issues that need to
be addressed in any effective eminent domain reform effort. First, a
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. §§ 2(b), 9(2).
Somin, supra note 4, at 2150–51.
H.R. 1433 § 2(c).
Id. § 4(a).
See supra Part III.B.2.
H.R. 1433 § 5.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FOLLOW-UP AUDIT OF FBI PERSONNEL RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT AND CASEWORK 8–14, 17–21 (April 2010).
144. Id. at 8, 28–29.
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century of Supreme Court public-use jurisprudence has clearly
established an expansive reading of the Fifth Amendment, making
the prospect of substantive change through the courts dubious at
best;145 legislative efforts are thus the preferred course. Second,
under most state eminent domain regimes, private developers have
no skin in the game; they acquire costless land through
condemnation, leading them to lobby for excessive takings.146 Third,
there are compelling reasons why an absolute ban on takings for
economic development, including blight removal, would be
misguided.147 Fourth, piecemeal reform efforts at the state level have
led to comprehensive protections in just thirteen states, no
protection in six states, and overprotection in four states,148 making
federal legislation the most promising avenue for effective reform.
Fifth, optimal eminent domain reform probably includes a ban on
economic-development takings, a narrowly defined blight exception,
and protections that prohibit non-blighted properties near blighted
areas from being condemned. Sixth, federal legislation must impose
meaningful penalties for violations and provide money damages to
promote adequate enforcement. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, any proposed legislation must generate enough
bipartisan support to actually become law. This Part puts forward a
tentative proposal that addresses each of these issues, modeled
loosely on shareholder derivative suits.
Generally, shareholder derivative suits allow a company
shareholder to sue an executive on behalf of the corporation. In
most cases, the plaintiff does not receive any damages, which are
instead remitted to the company. Before the suit can go forward, the
shareholder must ask the company to take action; if it refuses, the
litigant can proceed with her suit.149 Several aspects of this
framework, coupled with an effective definition of blight and public

145. See supra Part II. It is also worth noting that the Court has applied rational-basis
review to economic legislation for almost a century, see Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934), and economic-development takings naturally fall in that category. Persuading even the
Court’s most conservative members to overturn such an entrenched fixture of constitutional
law is unlikely.
146. See supra Part III.B.1.
147. See supra Part III.A.
148. See supra Part IV.A.
149. See generally DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS LAW
AND PRACTICE (2011).
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use, provide a useful starting point for a practical, politically viable
solution to the economic takings problem that addresses each of the
issues identified above.
To begin with, takings that result in the transfer of property from
one private entity to another should be prohibited. To that end, the
statute’s public-use definition should largely conform to H.R. 1433’s
language outlining permissible takings.150 The statute should also
include a narrowly defined blight exception, allowing condemned
property to be transferred to private developers only if the parcel’s
current use constitutes an immediate threat to public health and
safety. Condemnation of non-blighted property should be
prohibited, and no public entity should be allowed to condemn nonblighted property because of its proximity to blighted parcels.
Additionally, the statute should require developers and
municipalities in every condemnation proceeding to file a precondemnation report in the state’s real property recording system
that details the purpose of the taking, the expected qualitative
benefits, and the estimated monetary value of redevelopment. The
private developer would be required to pledge collateral to cover at
least half the monetary value stated in the pre-condemnation report.
Any person listed in the recording system as an owner of a fee simple
estate or other interest in the condemnation area would have a
private cause of action if the taking was either not for public use as
provided in the statute, or the benefits of the development failed to
accrue within a reasonable time after the condemnation. A successful
litigant would be entitled to her pro rata share151 of the monetary
value stated in the pre-condemnation report, and each owner of an
interest in the condemned area would automatically receive her own
pro rata share of the funds upon the conclusion of a successful
lawsuit regardless of whether the owner was party to the suit. Courts
would be free to impose punitive damages on parties that
150. Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2012, H.R. 1433, 112th Cong. § 9(1)(A)
(2012), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c112:H.R.1433: (allowing
takings for public ownership, availability to the general public, public transportation, public
infrastructure, incidental private use in a publicly owned building, acquiring abandoned
property, public utilities, and clearing defective titles).
151. To calculate each owner’s pro rata share, the value of each parcel in the condemned
area would be added up, and the value of each owner’s interest would be divided by the total
value, yielding a percentage of the total value. For instance, if an owner’s condemned property
was worth $100,000 in a condemned area with a total value of $1,000,000, she would be
entitled to ten percent of the monetary value listed in the pre-condemnation report.
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intentionally understate the benefits of a redevelopment project in
the pre-condemnation report. Procedurally, an aggrieved property
owner would first be required to approach the condemning
authority, state the basis of her claim, and request that the public and
private entity involved in the condemnation pay each owner his or
her pro rata share. If the condemning authority and the developer
refuse, a suit can commence. Plaintiffs’ attorneys would collect a
contingent fee based on the total recovery, not their client’s pro rata
share.
These provisions are important for several reasons. First, private
developers are forced to internalize the cost of condemnations when
making investment decisions, without letting state agencies off the
hook. Second, condemning authorities no longer have an incentive
to overstate the public benefits associated with a redevelopment
project; these authorities will be liable for at least fifty cents of every
dollar they overstate, and understating benefits risks the imposition
of punitive damages. Third, providing money damages, automatic
remittance of pro rata shares to property owners not party to the
lawsuit, and attorney fees proportional to the entire award provides
incentives for vigorous enforcement without burdening federal or
state law enforcement agencies, and takes into account the relative
poverty of those most often affected by condemnations. Fourth, the
enforcement mechanism and monetary damages provisions force
municipalities to carefully screen redevelopment proposals,
approving only those they feel are both certain to produce their
predicted benefits and strictly conform to statutory definitions of
public use.
Most importantly, these provisions provide something legislators
from both political parties could sell to their constituents. Liberals
can claim victory for protecting minorities and the poor from crony
capitalism, as well as forcing corporations to pay their fair share.
Conservatives can trumpet comprehensive private property
protections that forever prohibit the type of takings at issue in Kelo,
Midkiff, and Berman. Additionally, liberals would certainly feel
pressure from trial lawyer associations to approve a potential boon to
the profession.
In today’s hyper-partisan political environment, it is rare for
liberal and conservative lawmakers to share such broad agreement on
much of anything, let alone on a politicized issue like eminent
domain reform. It would be a shame for legislators from both sides
of the aisle to miss a historic opportunity to provide meaningful and
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equal Fifth Amendment protections for property owners across the
country. The Supreme Court’s early takings jurisprudence
unwittingly opened a veritable Pandora’s box of bad policy for which
a judicial remedy has proven elusive. Property rights advocates can
only hope Congress finally finds the lid.
Ryan Merriman

*

* JD candidate, April 2013, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
I am indebted to Joe Orien and A.J. Green for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts and
the BYU Law Review staff for their professionalism and attention to detail throughout the
publication process.
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State

Relevant
statutes and
Constitutional
provisions

Meaningful
limits on
economicdevelopment
takings

Narrow
definition
of blight
or no
blight
exception
at all

Prohibits
taking of
nonblighted
properties
in
blighted
areas

Alabama

ALA. CONST. art. I, §
23; ALA. CODE §§ 181B-2, 24-2-2, -6, 243-2 (2012).

Yes

Yes

Yes

Alaska

ALASKA STAT. §§
09.55.240(d),
29.35.030 (2011);
18.55.540(a),
.950(2), (14), (15)
(2010).

No
Prohibition is only
for takings whose
“purpose” is
transferring title
for private
development.

No

Arizona

ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 12-1132
(2006); 12-1136(5)
(West Supp. 2011).

Yes

No
Blight
definition
includes
inadequate
street layout,
faulty lot
layout, and
obsolete
platting.
Yes

Yes

Arkansas

ARK. CODE ANN. §
18-15-301(a) (2003).

No
Currently,
property can be
condemned for
“wharves, levees,
parks, squares,
market places, or
other lawful
purposes.”

No

No
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Relevant
statutes and
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Meaningful
limits on
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takings

Narrow
definition
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or no
blight
exception
at all

Prohibits
taking of
nonblighted
properties
in
blighted
areas

California

CAL. CONST. art. I, §
19; CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1240.010
(West 2007).

No

No

Colorado

COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 31-25105.5 (2004); 3125-103(2)(a)–(k.5)
(West Supp. 2011).
CONN. GEN. STAT. §
8-127a (2007).

No
Prohibits
conveying owneroccupied residents
to a private
person, but
exceptions
eviscerate any
substantive
protections.
Yes

No

No

No
Purports to limit
takings whose
primary purpose is
increasing tax
revenue, but
allows
condemnation
whenever “public
benefits . . .
outweigh any
private benefits”
Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes
Eminent
domain
cannot be
used to
eliminate
blight
Yes

Yes

Connecticut

Delaware

Florida

Georgia

DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
29, § 9501A; tit. 31,
§ 4501(3) (2009).
FLA. CONST. art. I, §
6; FLA. STAT. §§
73.013 to .014
(2006).

GA. CODE. ANN. §§
8-3-31; 22-1-1(1),
(4), (9)(A), -2(a)
(2006).

No
Three-fifths vote
by legislature
allows
conveyances to
private entities.
Yes

Yes
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Relevant
statutes and
Constitutional
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Meaningful
limits on
economic
development
takings

Narrow
definition
of blight
or no
blight
exception
at all

Prohibits
taking of
nonblighted
properties
in
blighted
areas

Hawaii
Idaho

No post-Kelo reform.
IDAHO CONST. art. I,
§ 14; IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 7-701A
(2006).

No
No
Strong statutory
language, but
exceptions in the
constitution
eviscerate any
actual protection.

No
No

Illinois

735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
30/5-5-5 (2007); 65
ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/11-74.4-3 (2012).
IND. CODE §§ 32-244.5-1, -7 (2006).

No

No
No
Blight
definition
requires specific
showing that
property poses
actual threat to
building
occupants, but
constitution
allows much
broader use of
condemnation
authority.
No

Yes

Yes

No

No
Non-blighted
properties can
be condemned
if located in an
area in which
75% of the
properties are
blighted.

Indiana

Iowa
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IOWA CODE §§
6A.21 to .22,
.24 (2006).

Yes
However, there is
an exception for
“certified
technology parks.”
Yes

No
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Relevant
statutes and
Constitutiona
l provisions

Meaningful
limits on
economic
developmen
t takings

Narrow
definitio
n of
blight or
no blight
exception
at all

Prohibits
taking of
nonblighted
propertie
s in
blighted
areas

Kansas

KAN. STAT. ANN. §§
26-501A to -501B
(2007).

Yes

Yes

Kentucky

KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 416.675, 99.705,
99.725 (West 2006).
LA. CONST. arts. I, §
4; VI, § 21.

No
Statute bans
economicdevelopment
takings, but there
is an exception for
legislative
authorizations.
Yes

No

No

No
Economicdevelopment
takings are
banned, but there
is an exception for
industrial parks.

Yes

Yes

No

Yes
While
residential
properties
cannot be
condemned
for industrial
parks, other
types of
property can.
No

No
Reform puts a 4year time limit on
condemnation
authorizations.
No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Louisiana

Maine

ME. REV. STAT. tit.
1, § 816; tit. 30-A, §
5101 (2006).
MD. CODE ANN.,
REAL PROPERTY §
12-105 (West
1990).

Maryland

Massachusett
s
Michigan

Minnesota

Mississippi

State

No post-Kelo
reform.
MICH. CONST. art.
X, § 2; MICH.
COMP. LAWS §
213.23 (2007).
MINN. STAT. §§
117.012, .025, .027
(2006).
Mississippi Ballot
Initiative #31
(2011).

Relevant

Meaningful

Narrow

Prohibits
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statutes and
Constitutional
provisions

limits on
economicdevelopment
takings

definition
of blight
or no
blight
exception
at all

taking of
nonblighted
properties
in
blighted
areas

Missouri

MO. REV. STAT. §§
523.271, .274,
99.805 (2006).

No

No
If 50% or more
of the parcels
in an area are
blighted, the
entire area can
be condemned.

Montana

MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 70-30-102, 7-154206(2) (2009).
NEB. REV. STAT. §§
76-710.04, 182103(11) (2010).

No
Statute prohibits
takings “solely for
economic
development,”
leaving
municipalities some
wiggle room.
Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No
Non-blighted
property can be
acquired if
located in an
area in which at
least two-thirds
of the parcels
are blighted.

Nebraska

Nevada
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NEV. CONST. art. I, §
22; NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 37.010 (2011),
279.388 (2005),
279.471 (2011).

No
Statute limits
takings “primarily
for economic
development,”
allowing
municipalities
leeway to assert
other qualifying
purposes to justify
an otherwise
impermissible
taking.
Yes
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of blight
or no
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at all
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taking of
nonblighted
properties
in
blighted
areas

New
Hampshire

N.H. CONST. PT. I,
ART. 12-A; N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 203:3,
205:2, :3-A (2012).
No post-Kelo reform

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

N.M. STAT. ANN. §
3-60A-10 (2007).
No post-Kelo reform
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
160A-503(2A), 512(6), -515 (2012).
N.D. CONST. ART. I,
§ 16; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-15-01
(2012).
OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 163.01
(LexisNexis 2012).

Yes

Yes

Yes

No
Yes

No
No

No
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No
Takings are
allowed for
economic
development if the
purpose is not
“solely” to increase
tax revenue.
No
No
Statute bans
takings if the
government has
“intent” to transfer
it to a private
party, which may
be difficult to
prove.

No

No
Whole area can
be taken if 70%
of the parcels
are blighted

No
Yes

No
Yes

New
Jersey
New
Mexico
New York
North
Carolina
North
Dakota

Ohio

Oklahoma
Oregon

No post-Kelo reform
OR. REV. STAT. §
35.015 (2010).
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economicdevelopmen
t takings

Narrow
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n of
blight or
no blight
exception
at all

Prohibits
taking of
nonblighted
properties
in
blighted
areas

Pennsylvani
a

26 PA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 202, 203, 204,
205 (West 2006).
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§
42-64.12-6 to -7
(2008).
S.C. CONST. art. I, §
13.
S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 11-7-22.1
to .2 (2006).
TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 29-17-102, 1320-201 (2006), 1320-202 (2010), 2917-1003 (2006).

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No
Prohibition on
private-to-private
takings includes
an exception for
industrial parks.
Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No
Prohibits takings
whose “primary
purpose” is
economic
development.
Yes

No

No
Neighborhood
s can vote to
approve a
private-toprivate transfer.
No

Yes

Yes

Rhode
Island
South
Carolina
South
Dakota
Tennessee

Texas

Utah

TEX. CONST. art. I, §
17; TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN. §
2206.001 (2011);
TEX. LOC. GOV’T
CODE ANN. §
374.003 (2011).
UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 17C-2-303, -601,
78B-6-501 (2011).

Vermont

VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 1040; tit. 24, §
3201(3), (19)(J)
(2005).

Virginia

VA. CODE ANN. § 1219.1 (2012).
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at all
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taking of
nonblighted
properties
in
blighted
areas

Washington

WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 8.08.020,
.25.290(2007).
W. VA. CODE §§ 541-2, 16-18-3, -6A
(2006).

No

No

No

Yes

No

Wisconsin

WIS. STAT. § 32.03
(2011).

No

Wyoming

WYO. STAT. ANN. §§
1-26-801, 15-9-133,
15-9-103 (2007).

No
Prohibition
depends on
whether the
condemning
authority
“intends” to
convey or lease the
property to a
private entity.
Yes

Yes
However,
government
can condemn
non-blighted
property if it
can show that
it has taken
every
reasonable
effort to avoid
using eminent
domain, and
there is no
alternative site
available for
purchase.
Yes,
but only for
residential
properties

West
Virginia

No

Yes
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